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I. INTRODUCTION
While Minnesota has long recognized the right of privacy in certain
contexts,1 the Minnesota Supreme Court only recently analyzed a cause of
action for invasion of privacy by private individuals. In Lake v. Wal-Mart
Stores, Inc.,2 the supreme court finally bestowed on every Minnesotan this
1. See State v. Gray, 413 N.W.2d 107, 111 (Minn. 1987) (recognizing a right
to privacy in regard to fundamental rights under both the Minnesota and United
States Constitutions). See also Michael K. Steenson, Fundamental Rights in the "Gray"
Area: The Right of Privacy Under the Minnesota Constitution, 20 WM. MITCHELL L. REv.
383, 394-414 (1994) (discussing Minnesota precedent supporting privacy interests
under the Minnesota and United States Constitutions).
2. 582 N.W.2d 231 (Minn. 1998).
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much needed right. s
This case note will examine the historical and philosophical devel-
opment of the right to privacy, delineating its foundations in tort law4 and
briefly outlining the development of the right to privacy protecting indi-
viduals from government intrusion.5 This case note will then discuss how
states have recognized the right to privacy tort 6 and examine Minnesota
case precedent addressing this issue.
This case note will then analyze the Lake decision and discuss why the
Minnesota Supreme Court's holding was a correct one, particularly in
light of recent technological advances. Finally, this case note will posit
that the supreme court failed to adequately explain its holding3 and argue
that Minnesota courts should look to the boundaries imposed on the right
to privacy tort by other states for guidance in applying this cause of ac-
tion.
II. HISTORY
A. The Right to Privacy in Tort
Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis supported the right to pri-
vacy in the late 1800s.1 They argued that every person was entitled to "the
right to be let alone."'2 Warren and Brandeis proposed that privacy en-
compassed the protection of thoughts, emotions and sensations and
listed photographs and newspapers as inventions necessitating the need• . 14
for the recognition of privacy rights. They also viewed the rise of "gossip
3. See id. at 236 (recognizing right to privacy, protecting against invasion by
private individuals and stating that previous Minnesota cases had addressed pri-
vacy only in dicta).
4. See infra notes 11-35 and accompanying text.
5. See infra notes 36-46 and accompanying text.
6. See infta notes 47-78 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 91-113 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 114-141 and accompanying text.
9. See infra note 142 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 143-147 and accompanying text.
11. See Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right To Pivacy, 4 HARV.
L. REV. 193, 193 (1890). Warren and Brandeis gave a legal definition to the
boundary between personal and public space. See Randall Bezanson, The Right to
Privacy Revisited: Privacy, News and Social Change, 1890-1990, 80 CALIF. L. REv. 1133,
1135 (1992) (discussing Warren and Brandeis article). Warren and Brandeis pre-
sented privacy as "fundamental to the wholeness of the individual, and reflecting
the social environment in which people exist." Id. at 1134. Warren and Brandeis'
article is considered pioneering and extraordinarily influential. See id. at 1133; see
also William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIf. L. REV. 383, 383 (1960).
12. Warren and Brandeis, supra note 11, at 193.
13. See id. at 195.
14. See id.
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as a trade" as warranting a right to privacy.' 5 To Warren and Brandeis,
these technological and societal changes made the recognition of the
right to privacy essential, stating that "[t]he intensity and complexity of
life, attendant upon advancing civilization, have rendered necessary some
retreat from the world.., but modem enterprise and invention have,
through invasions upon [an individual's] privacy, subjected him to mental
pain and distress, far greater than could be inflicted by mere bodily in-
jury."16 The authors recommended that certain remedies, including the
ability to bring actions in tort for damages or actions for injunctive relief,
be available for claims of invasion of privacy by private individuals.
7
Warren and Brandeis' concerns for individual privacy proved time-
less.' 8 Recently, in Shulman v. Group W Productions, Inc.,19 the California
Supreme Court embraced Warren and Brandeis' modem technologies
concern when it declared that "the newspapers of 1890 have been joined
by the electronic media; today, a vast number of books, journals, television
and radio stations, cable channels and Internet content sources all com-
pete to satisfy... our love of gossip [and] our curiosity about the private
lives of others.... 20
In support of Warren and Brandeis' thesis, courts made efforts to
apply the right to privacy.2' Eventually, William L. Prosser classified these
court decisions into four distinct causes of action.2 2 The American Law
Institute adopted Prosser's four-tort theory into the following separate
torts: (1) unreasonable intrusion upon seclusion of another, (2) appro-
15. Id. at 196.
16. Id.
17. See id. at 219. Warren and Brandeis suggested imposing limitations, such
as allowing publication of matters of public interest and not allowing recovery
when the publication is oral, absent special damages. See id. at 214-17.
18. See Bezanson, supra note 11, at 1134. Warren and Brandeis "presented
the idea of privacy as it should be understood: as deeply entrenched in culture,
evolving over time, fundamental to the wholeness of the individual, and reflecting
the social environment in which people exist." Id.
19. 955 P.2d 469 (Cal. 1998).
20. Id. at 473.
21. See Diane Zimmerman, Requiem for a Heavyweight: A Farewell to Warren and
Brandeis's Privacy Tort, 68 CORNELL L. REV. 291, 292 (1983) (commenting that War-
ren and Brandeis' article led a minor revolution in the development of the com-
mon law right to privacy).
22. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS, §
117, at 850-51 (5th ed. 1984). While Prosser's classifications have been credited
with stimulating academic thought about the right to privacy, they have also been
accused of divorcing this thinking from the concept originally posited by Warren
and Brandeis. See Sheldon W. Halpern, Rethinking the Right of Privacy: Dignity, De-
cency, and the Law's Limitations, 43 RuTGERS L. REv. 539, 543 (1991); see also Zim-
merman, supra note 21, at 294-95 (stating that today the right of privacy is a "catch-
all" having little or nothing to do with the tort envisioned by Warren and Bran-
deis).
1999]
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priation of another's likeness, (3) publication of private facts, and (4)
23
publicity that places another in false light.
Intrusion upon seclusion is actionable when a person intrudes upon
the solitude of another's affairs if the intrusion would be highly offensive
24to a reasonable person. Forceful entry into another's place of seclusion,
covertly listening to a conversation, and searching another's wallet or
opening another's mail are examples of intrusion upon seclusion." Ap-
propriation occurs when a Ierson takes the name or likeness of another
for his or her own benefit. Using a person's photograph to advertise a
27product without the person's consent is an appropnation. This tort is
not limited to appropriation for commercial use; liability arises for im-
personating another to obtain information, or filing a lawsuit in another's
29
name.
Publication of private facts is actionable when a person publicizes
another's private matter if the publication is highly offensive and not of
legitimate public interest. This right is violated, for example, when a
creditor posts a sign informing the public of another's debt or when a
person steals a photograph from another and publicly presents it.31
23. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 652A-652E (1977); KEETON ET
AL., supra note 22, at 851-66. This classification scheme has been criticized. For
example, the Indiana Supreme Court stated that each privacy tort resembled other
distinct torts. See Doe v. Methodist Hosp., 690 N.E.2d 681, 685 (Ind. 1997) (opining
that the privacy tort functions as "little more than a 'lite' version of trespass, out-
rage, or defamation-promising the same great take with only half the facts").
24. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B (1977).
25. See id. § 652B cmt. b.
26. See id. § 652C.
27. See id. § 652C cmt. b, illus. 1.
28. See id. § 652C cmt. b.
29. See id. § 652C cmt. b, illus. 3, 6.
30. See id. § 652D. Publication of private facts is the most widely recognized
privacy tort. See Zimmerman, supra note 21, at 365-67. However, some courts still
have objections. See id. For example, the Indiana Supreme Court voiced its criti-
cism of the tort by stating:
Perhaps Victorian sensibilities once provided a sound basis of distinction,
but our more open and tolerant society has largely outgrown such ajusti-
fication. In our "been there, done that" age of talk shows, tabloids and
twelve-step programs, public disclosures of private facts are far less likely
to cause shock, offense, or emotional distress than at the time Warren
and Brandeis wrote their famous article.
Doe v. Methodist Hosp., 690 N.E.2d 681, 692 (Ind. 1997).
31. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D cmts. a-b (1977). The belief
that wrongs of this nature should be compensated was strongly advocated by War-
ren and Brandeis when they stated, "for years there has been a feeling that the law
must afford some remedy for the unauthorized circulation of portraits of private
persons." Warren and Brandeis, supra note 11, at 195.
1002 [Vol. 25
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The false light tort is publication of a matter that places another in a
false light if the falsity would be highly offensive to a reasonable person
and the publisher has knowledge of or has acted in reckless disregard of
the falsity." Publishing an article regarding fraud along with a photo-
graph of an innocent person, implying he engages in fraudulent activity
when he has never done so, is an example of false light invasion of pri-
33
vacy.
Warren and Brandeis also proposed limitations to the right to pri-
34vacy's application. Specifically, they suggested that the tort not be ex-
tended to cases involving publication of matters of public interest or to
35cases where the plaintiff had not suffered damages.
B. Protection of Privacy from Governmental Intrusion
The United States Supreme Court has recognized various rights to
privacy under the United States Constitution.3 6 The Supreme Court first
recognized the right to privacy from governmental intrusion in Griswold v.
Connecticut. In Griswold, the Court held that Connecticut's birth control
38law, which made it a crime to discuss use of contraceptive devices, was an
unconstitutional intrusion on the right to marital privacy. 39 The Court
ruled that the marital relationship resides in a "constitutionally-created
40zone of privacy" that is free from intrusion by the government. Also, in
32. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) or TORTS § 652E (1977).
33. See id. cmt. b, illus. 2.
34. See Warren and Brandeis, supra note 11, at 214-20.
35. See id. at 214-17.
36. See infra notes 37-44 and accompanying text. See generally Steenson, supra
note 1, at 384-91 (analyzing privacy rights under the United States Constitution).
37. 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965). The concept of privacy was addressed by the
Court much earlier. See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 474-78 (1928)
(Brandeis, J., dissenting), overruled by Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353
(1967). In Olmstead, Justice Brandeis stated in his dissent that:
[The framers of the Constitution] undertook to secure conditions favor-
able to the pursuit of happiness. They recognized the significance of
man's spiritual nature, of his feelings and his intellect. They knew that
only a part of the pain, pleasure and satisfactions of life are to be found
in material things. They sought to protect Americans in their beliefs,
their thoughts, their emotions and their sensations. They conferred, as
against the Government, the right to be let alone-the most comprehen-
sive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men.
Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 478 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). The majority condoned the
government's use of information obtained through wiretapping. See id. at 469.
38. See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 480.
39. See id. at 486.
40. See id. at 485. The Court stated that marital privacy is protected from gov-
ernmental intrusion by the protective penumbra created by the Bill of Rights. See
1999l 1003
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perhaps the most famous decision regarding the right to privacy, the
Court in Roe v. Wade4' held that the constitutional right to privacy in-42
cluded a woman's right to terminate a pregnancy. In Katz v. United
States,43 the Court determined that the government listening and record-
ing telephone communications was an unconstitutional violation of pri-
vacy, ruling that the Constitution protects private conversations from gov-
ernment intrusion.44
Katz is significant because the court expressly gave the state courts
the decision to recognize a common law right to protection from invasion• . . 45
of privacy by private individuals. The Court determined that while the
United States Constitution affords some specific protection against gov-
ernmental invasion, the determination of whether a person is entitled to a
general right to privacy is to be left to each 
state.46
III. INTERPRETATION OF THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY TORT
A. Throughout the United States
At the time Lake was decided, forty-seven states and the District of Co-
lumbia recognized a tort for invasion of privacy by private individuals.47
id.
41. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
42. See id. at 153.
43. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
44. See id. at 359.
45. See id. at 350-51. The Court clarified its holdings in Otmstead and Griswold
by stating that while there are provisions in the Constitution that protect an indi-
vidual's right to privacy against forms of government invasion, the Fourth
Amendment and other provisions of the Constitution cannot be translated into
giving a general privacy right. See id. at 350.
46. See id.
47. See MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 214, § lB (West 1989) (establishing a right
to protection against unreasonable, substantial or serious interference with pri-
vacy); NEB. REv. STAT. ANN. § 20-201 (West 1995) (establishing a legal remedy for
exploitation of one's name, picture, portrait or personality for advertising or trade
purposes, intrusion upon one's place of solitude or seclusion, and for placing one
in a false light); N.Y. CIv. RIGHTS LAw § 50 (McKinney 1992); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-1-
28.1 (1997) (stating that every person has a right to privacy and listing four privacy
torts when describing that right); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-40 (Michie 1992) (stating
that one can sue in equity and for damages if one's name, portrait or picture is
used for advertising or trade purposes without written consent); WIS. STAT. ANN. §
895.50 (West 1997) (stating that the right to privacy is recognized in the state and
one can seek equitable relief and damages for intrusion); Busby v. Truswal Sys.
Corp., 551 So. 2d 322, 328 (Ala. 1989); Breese v. Smith, 501 P.2d 159, 171 (Alaska
1972); Godbehere v. Phoenix Newspapers, Inc., 783 P.2d 781, 784 (Ariz. 1989);
Dodson v. Dicker, 812 S.W.2d 97, 99 (Ark. 1991); Melvin v. Reid, 297 P. 91, 93
(Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1931); Rugg v. McCarty, 476 P.2d 753, 754-55 (Colo. 1970);
Goodrich v. Waterbury Republican-Am., Inc., 448 A.2d 1317, 1328 (Conn. 1982);
1004 [Vol. 25
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The majority of states recognizing the right to privacy tort have analyzed
Prosser's four causes of action. However, they differ as to which of the• 49
four causes of action to recognize and disagree as to which standard to
use when applying each tort. The right to privacy has been discussed at
length yet courts still have difficulty in its application. The Alaska Su-
preme Court, for example, has stated that "the concept of privacy has be-
come pervasive in modem legal thought. But a clear definition of this
Barbieri v. News-Journal Co., 189 A.2d 773, 774 (Del. 1963); Vassiliades v. Garfin-
ckel's, 492 A.2d 580, 587 (D.C. 1985); Cason v. Baskin, 20 So. 2d 243, 250 (Fla.
1945); Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 50 S.E. 68, 69 (Ga. 1905); Ferger-
strom v. Hawaiian Ocean View Estates, 441 P.2d 141, 143 (Haw. 1968); Baker v.
Burlington N., Inc., 587 P.2d 829, 832 (Idaho 1978); Leopold v. Levin, 259 N.E.2d
250, 254 (I11. 1970); State ex rel. Mavity v. Tyndall, 66 N.E.2d 755, 760 (Ind. 1946);
Stessman v. American Black Hawk Broad. Co., 416 N.W.2d 685, 686 (Iowa 1987);
Finlay v. Finlay, 856 P.2d 183, 189 (Kan. Ct. App. 1993); Yancey v. Hamilton, 786
S.W.2d 854, 860 (Ky. 1989); Young v. St. Landry Parish Sch. Bd., 673 So. 2d 1272,
1275 (La. Ct. App. 1996); MacKerron v. Madura, 445 A.2d 680, 682 (Me. 1982);
Lawrence v. A.S. Abell Co., 475 A.2d 448, 450 (Md. 1984); Doe v. Mills, 536
N.W.2d 824, 828 (Mich. Ct. App. 1995); Candebat v. N.J. Flanagan, 487 So. 2d 207,
209 (Miss. 1986); Y.G. & L.G. v. Jewish Hosp., 795 S.W.2d 488, 497 (Mo. Ct. App.
1990); Sistok v. Northwestern Tel. Sys., Inc., 615 P.2d 176, 181 (Mont. 1980); Mon-
tesano v. Donrey Media Group, 668 P.2d 1081, 1084 (Nev. 1983); Hamberger v.
Eastman, 206 A.2d 239, 242 (N.H. 1964); Rumbauskas v. Cantor, 649 A.2d 853,
858 (N.J. 1994); Andrews v. Stallings, 892 P.2d 611, 625 (N.M. Ct. App. 1995); Hall
v. Post, 372 S.E.2d 711, 713 (N.C. 1988); Housh v. Peth, 133 N.E.2d 340, 343
(Ohio 1956); Eddy v. Brown, 715 P.2d 74, 77 (Okla. 1986); Hinish v. Meier &
Frank Co., 113 P.2d 438, 446 (Or. 1941); Curran v. Children's Serv. Ctr., Inc., 578
A.2d 8, 12 (Pa. 1990); O'Shea v. Lesser, 416 S.E. 2d 629, 633 (S.C. 1992); Krueger
v. Austad, 545 N.W.2d 205, 215-16 (S.D. 1996); Martin v. Senators, Inc., 418 S.W.2d
660, 662 (Tenn. 1967); Cain v. Hearst Corp., 878 S.W.2d 577, 578 (Tex. 1994);
Turner v. Gen. Adjustment Bureau, Inc., 832 P.2d 62, 67 (Utah Ct. App. 1992);
Hodgdon v. Mt. Mansfield Co., 624 A.2d 1122, 1129 (Vt. 1992); Eastwood v. Cas-
cade Broad. Co., 722 P.2d 1295, 1296 (Wash. 1986); Roach v. Harper, 105 S.E.2d
564, 568 (W. Va. 1958).
48. See supra notes 22-23 and accompanying text; see, e.g., Robert C. Ozer, P.C.
v. Borquez, 940 P.2d 371, 377 (Colo. 1997) (developing a specific right against in-
vasion of privacy by publication of private facts after noting the four types of inva-
sion); Goodrich, 448 A.2d at 1329 (observing that the tort of privacy is not one tort,
but the four torts as defined by Prosser).
49. Compare Doe v. Methodist Hosp., 690 N.E.2d 681, 692 (Ind. 1997) (failing
to recognize invasion of privacy by publication of private facts) with Ozer, 940 P.2d
at 377 (recognizing only the tort of publication of private facts).
50. See Kinsey v. Macur, 165 Cal. Rptr. 608, 611 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980) (stating
that to recover under the tort of publicity, a plaintiff must show that the publicity
was to the public at large or to a large number of people, as opposed to simply a
few individuals); Young v. Jackson, 572 So. 2d 378, 382 (Miss. 1990) (stating the
standard for recovery under public disclosure includes the requirement that one
must reasonably foresee that another would be offended by the publication); Blev-
ins v. Sorrell, 589 N.E.2d 438, 441 (Ohio Ct. App. 1990) (finding that for invasion
of privacy to be actionable the invasion must cause outrage or serious emotional
distress).
1999] 1005
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right... has eluded both courts and legal scholars.""'
States recognizing the right to privacy have done so under the fed-.. . 52 5354
eral or their state constitutions, the common law,55 or by statute. Most
states have placed limits on its invocation.55
1. Constitutional Foundations for the Privacy Tort
Georgia's supreme court was the first to embrace the right to privacy
in the context of an action against a private individual. In Pavesich v. New
England Life Insurance Co.,56 the court maintained that individuals surren-
der many rights that they would otherwise be free to exercise in return for57
the benefits they receive for being members of society. The court added,
however, that individuals do not relinquish all such rights, reasoning that
people have the right to keep purely private matters away from the public
eye. The court ultimately determined that the right to privacy was de-
rivative of natural law and from rights guaranteed by the constitutions of
both the United States and the state of Georgia. The Pavesich court
found that it could recognize the right to privacy because it had been ac-
knowledged under other causes of action and fell within the right to per-
sonal liberty.6O
Other states that recognize the privacy tort as grounded in the fed-
eral or their state constitutions include Missouri, California, and Florida.S61
In Munden v. Harris, the Missouri Supreme Court held that the right to62
privacy was part of the constitutional right to life and happiness. Cali-
fornia courts found a tort action for invasion of privacy in its state consti-63
tution under the right to pursue and obtain happiness. Florida found
the right grounded in the Declaration of Rights in its state constitution.64
51. Luedtke v. Nabors Alaska Drilling, Inc., 768 P.2d 1123, 1128 (Alaska
1989).
52. See infra notes 56-64 and accompanying text.
53. See infra notes 65-72 and accompanying text.
54. See infra notes 73-78 and accompanying text.
55. See infra notes 79-90 and accompanying text.
56. 50 S.E. 68 (Ga. 1905).
57. See id. at 72.
58. See id.
59. See id. at 71.
60. See id. at 71-72.
61. 134 S.W. 1076 (Mo. Ct. App. 1911).
62. See id. at 1078.
63. See Melvin v. Reid, 297 P. 91, 93 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1931). The court
noted that privacy rights did not exist at common law and that it would be loathe
to recognize the right as accepted by other jurisdictions absent any provision of
law. See id.
64. See Cason v. Baskin, 20 So. 2d 243, 250-51 (Fla. 1944). The Cason court
determined that the word "person" in the declaration meant not just one's body,
but the "whole man, his personality as well as his physical body." Id. at 250. Thus,
1006 [Vol. 25
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2. The Right to Privacy Grounded in the Common Law
Other state courts recognize the right to privacy as evolving from the
common law. Many of these decisions echo Warren and Brandeis' con-65
cerns regarding the need for the common law to address societal change
and advancing technology. 66 In Truxes v. Kenco Enterprises, Inc.,67 the South
Dakota supreme court stated:
One of the principle arguments advanced in support of the doc-
trine of privacy by its original exponents is that the increased
complexity and intensity of modern civilization and the devel-
opment of man's spiritual sensibilities have rendered man more
sensitive to publicity and have increased his need of privacy,
while the great technological improvements in the means of
communications have more and more subjected the intimacies
of his private life to exploitation by those who pander to com-
mercialism and to prurient and idle curiosity.
61
In Hinish v. Meier & Frank Co.,69 the Oregon Supreme Court also
stated that modem scientific inventions made invasions of privacy more
common and more offensive. 70 The court recognized the common law's
unique ability to meet increasing technological threats to personal pri-
vacy,7' declaring that "[t]he common law's capacity to discover and apply
remedies for acknowledged wrongs without waiting on legislation [was]
one of its cardinal virtues."
72
this "person" could be injured emotionally as well as physically, and such emo-
tional injury demanded remedy. See id.
65. See supra notes 11-17 and accompanying text.
66. See, e.g., Beverly v. Reinert, 606 N.E.2d 621, 622-26 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992)
(examining the effects of facsimile transmissions on the right to privacy and warn-
ing courts to proceed with caution in defining which communications constitute
invasions of privacy because of the societal importance of a free flow of informa-
tion).
67. 119 N.W.2d 914 (S.D. 1963).
68. Id. at 916 (quoting 41 AM. JUR. Privacy § 9). See also McCormack v. Okla-
homa Publ'g Co., 613 P.2d 737, 740 (Okla. 1980). "[T]he common law is not
static, but is a dynamic and growing thing and its rules arise from the application
of reason to the changing conditions of society." Id.
69. 113 P.2d 438 (Or. 1941).
70. See id. at 440. The court also viewed a demand for privacy as "growing out
of the conditions of life in the crowded communities of to-day [sic]...." Id at 441
(citing Dean Pound, Interests of Personality, 28 HARv. L. REV. 343, 362-63 (1915)).
71. See id. at 446.
72. Id. at 447.
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3. Legislatively-created Right to Privacy
Conversely, some courts do not recognize a right to privacy, ruling
that the right was unknown in the common law and was not present in the
federal or state constitutions. 73 For example, in Roberson v. Rochester Fold-
ing Box Co.,7 4 the New York Court of Appeals found no support for the
right to privacy tort under the United States Constitution or in the com-75
mon law. The court stated, "[T] he so-called 'right-of-privacy' has not yet
found an abiding place in our jurisprudence, and.. .the doctrine cannot
now be incorporated without doing violence to settled principles of law..
76•.6 The New York legislature subsequently enacted a right to privacy by
77
statute. Other states have similarly enacted privacy statutes to protect
their residents' privacy rights."
4. Judicially-imposed Limitations on the Right to Privacy
Many states recognize that the right to privacy must have restrictions
placed on it to limit litigation and protect the conflicting interests of the79
individual and society at large. In an effort to impose restrictions, states
73. See Brunson v. Ranks Army Store, 73 N.W.2d 803, 806 (Neb. 1955) (find-
ing no common law right to privacy); Judevine v. Benzies-Montanye Fuel & Ware-
house Co., 269 N.W. 295, 302 (Wis. 1936) (holding that it is more fitting for pri-
vacy rights to be created by legislature since the right does not exist in common
law). See also Hinish, 113 P.2d at 440 (explaining that some courts believe that no
legal redress could be granted for privacy claims because the right was unknown to
the common law and to recognize it would be judicial legislation).
74. 64 N.E. 442 (N.Y. 1902).
75. See id. at 447.
76. Id. The Roberson court believed that recognition of the right to privacy
would "necessarily result not only in a vast amount of litigation, but in litigation
bordering on the absurd." Id. at 443.
77. See N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAw § 50 (1992). The New York privacy statute states
that one "that uses for advertising purposes ... the name, portrait or picture of
any living person without having first obtained written consent... is guilty of a
misdemeanor." Id. The statute also asserts that the identity of a victim of a sex of-
fense is confidential and if disclosed, the victim may bring an action to recover
damages. See id. at § 50b-50c. New York's privacy statute was held constitutional in
Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967), due to the United State Supreme Court's
careful interpretation of the statute as not being invasive of the constitutional pro-
tections of freedom of the press and freedom of speech. See id. at 397.
78. See MASS. GEN. LAwSANN. ch. 214, § lB (West 1989); NEB. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 20-201 (West 1995); R.I. GEN. LAwS § 9-1-28.1 (1997); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.0140
(Michie 1992); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 895.50 (West 1997).
79. See infra notes 81-90 and accompanying text; see also, Truxes v. Kenco En-
ter., Inc., 119 N.W.2d 914, 916 (S.D. 1963) (noting that many courts have had
great difficulty in fixing proper limits on privacy and recommending they proceed
1008 [Vol. 25
10
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 25, Iss. 3 [1999], Art. 3
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol25/iss3/3
NO LONGER LIVING INA GLASS HOUSE
have declared certain acts privileged from invasion of privacy claims.80 For
example, some acts done by creditors and employers are privileged.81
States have also given privileges to publications that are deemed newswor-
thy, citing society's continuing interest in obtaining news.82 In addition,
courts have placed restrictions on public figures' and officials' ability to
recover under this tort.s3 Courts require that those in the public eye meet
a more stringent standard than private citizens in order to recover for in-
vasions of their privacy.84
The United States Supreme Court examined the publication of pri-
vate facts in Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn.s5 In Cox, a television broadcast-
ing company publicized the name of a rape victim it had obtained from
86
court documents. The Court ruled that the company had a constitu-
cautiously when doing so).
80. See, e.g., Luedtke v. Nabors Alaska Drilling, Inc., 768 P.2d 1123, 1133-37
(Alaska 1989) (recognizing the public's interest in maintaining safe work envi-
ronments and holding that employers may perform drug testing on their employ-
ees provided a specific procedure is followed); Pavesich v. New England Life Ins.
Co., 50 S.E. 68, 73-74 (Ga. 1905) (stating that the right to privacy is unquestionably
limited by the right to speak and print). Some states have applied the privileges
afforded in defamation actions to invasion of privacy claims. See Senogles v. Secu-
rity Benefit Life Ins. Co., 536 P.2d 1358, 1361-62 (Kan. 1975) (allowing privileges
in libel and slander suits to privacy suit); Smith v. Arkansas La. Gas Co., 645 So. 2d
785, 789-90 (La. Ct. App. 1994) (holding that invasion of privacy is subject to same
privileges as defamation); Lee v. Nash, 671 P.2d 703, 706 (Or. Ct. App. 1983) (de-
termining that absolute privilege in defamation suits applies to invasion of privacy
claims); Russell v. Thomson Newspapers, Inc., 842 P.2d 896, 906 (Utah 1992)
(holding that qualified privileges in defamation actions apply to intentional inflic-
tion of emotional distress and privacy claims); Crump v. Beckley Newspapers, Inc.,
320 S.E.2d 70, 83 (W. Va. 1983) (determining that the same absolute and qualified
privileges available in defamation actions are available in invasion of privacy ac-
tions).
81. See, e.g., Luedtke, 768 P.2d at 1136-37 (holding that employers have quali-
fied privilege to perform drug testing on employees); Yoder v. Smith, 112 N.W.2d
862, 864 (Iowa 1962) (holding that a creditor sending a letter to a debtor's em-
ployer is not an invasion of privacy).
82. See, e.g., CAL. CMAL CODE § 47 (West 1992 & Supp. 1998) (granting privi-
leges to certain types of publications and broadcasts); Cape Publications, Inc. v.
Bridges, 423 So. 2d 426, 427-28 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (holding that the plain-
tiff may not recover for publication of a distressful photograph because of the
newspaper's privilege to publish items of public interest); Hubbard v. Journal
Publ'g Co., 368 P.2d 147, 148 (N.M. 1962) (stating that the publication was privi-
leged even though plaintiff involuntarily participated in the activity described in
article).
83. See Shulman v. Group W Prods., Inc., 955 P.2d 469, 477 (Cal. 1998) (limit-
ing recovery for public figures who claimed invasion of privacy by publication of
private facts); see also Crump, 320 S.E.2d at 83-84 (discussing the boundaries of the
public figure doctrine).
84. See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
85. 420 U.S. 469 (1975).
86. See id. at 472-74.
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tionally protected right to publicize information it had obtained from•87
public records. While the Court did not determine whether one can88
publicize information that is not of legitimate public interest, the Court
did take note of the tension between the interests in privacy and constitu-
tional rights. 8 The Court ultimately stated that "[b]ecause the gravamen
of the claimed injury is the publication of information, whether true or
not, the dissemination of which is embarrassing or otherwise painful to an
individual, it is here that claims of privacy most directly confront the con-
stitutional freedoms of speech and press."90
B. Minnesota Precedent Addressing the Right to Privacy Tort
Minnesota decisions rejecting the right to privacy in cases that pre-
ceded Lake erroneously read a Minnesota Supreme Court decision as
standing for the proposition that Minnesota did not recognize a cause of
action for invasion of privacy by private individuals.9 1 In Hendry v. Con-
ner,92 the Minnesota Supreme Court gave cursory treatment to the ques-.... 93
tion of invasion of privacy by a private individual. In Hendry, the plaintiff
sought recovery for having been loudly told by a hospital employee that
her child would not be admitted to the hospital until an outstanding bill
914
was paid. The hospital employee also made reference to the plaintiffs
bankruptcy proceedings.
The Hendry court listed factors that could give rise to a claim for inva-
sion of privacy, including undue or oppressive publicity and the degree of
offensiveness to a reasonable person.g6 The court stated that the extent of
publicity or degree of harassment determined whether the right to privacy
97was invaded, and it declared that the publicity must be undue or oppres-
sive and lift the curtain on a subject matter that a reasonable person of
ordinary sensibilities would find offensive and objectionable.98
87. See id. at 494-95.
88. See id. at 491.
89. See id. at 488-89.
90. Id. at 489; see also Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 387-88 (1967) (balanc-
ing constitutional rights and individual privacy in imposing limitations on the tort
of false light); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964) (re-
quiring the plaintiffs prove the defendant had knowledge of the falsity of the
statements it published, or had reckless disregard of their falsity, before they could
recover under the tort of false light).
91. See infra notes 92-113 and accompanying text.
92. 303 Minn. 317, 226 N.W.2d 921 (1975).
93. See id. at 318, 226 N.W.2d at 922.
94. See id.
95. See id.
96. See id. at 318-19, 226 N.W.2d at 922-23.
97. See id.
98. See id.
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The court ultimately decided, however, that the plaintiff's situation
did not warrant recovery under the right to privacy tort because the hospi-
tal employee's behavior did not meet these factors.99 The Hendry court
went on to declare that, because the plaintiff's allegations did not give rise
to a privacy claim, it was not necessary for the disposition of the case to
decide whether a cause of action for invasion of privacy should be recog-
nized in Minnesota. 100 Thus, the court never decided whether Minnesota
should adopt the tort.
In Stubbs v. North Memorial Medical Center,1°' the Minnesota Court of
Appeals was presented with a situation that fit the factors articulated in
Hendry.102 In Stubbs, the plaintiff brought a privacy claim against a physi-
cian who performed cosmetic surgery on her and published her "before"
and "after" photos without her consent.'0 3 The court felt that the plaintiff
deserved some form of redress for the invasion of her privacy, 104 but de-
nied her claims, ruling that it was not its role to establish new causes of ac-
tion.105
106
In Richie v. Paramount Pictures Corp., the Minnesota Supreme Court
had the opportunity to recognize the right to privacy in the context of a
07-false light invasion of privacy claim.1°  The Richie plaintiffs brought a
claim against a media producer for invasion of privacy, alleging that their
photos were shown in a false light on a national television show.' Citing
Hendry, the Richie court dismissed the plaintiffs' claims, stating that it had
never recognized invasion of privacy as a cause of action.'09
Subsequent Minnesota Court of Appeals' decisions read Hendry and
99. See id. at 319, 226 N.W.2d at 923. The Hendiy court held that the plain-
tiffs situation did not meet the elements of a privacy claim because (1) a bank-
ruptcy record is a public fact; (2) the plaintiff could not establish extensive public-
ity of the comments, and (3) the incident occurred only once. See id. Hence, the
publication was not oppressive enough to allow for recovery. See id.
100. See id.
101. 448 N.W.2d 78 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989).
102. See id. at 79-80.
103. See id.
104. See id. at 80. The court stated that "[w] here, as here, unwanted publicity
is given to an aspect of an individual's life which is inherently private,justice would
seem to require that there be some form of redress under the law." Id.
105. See id. at 81. However, in making this statement, the court did not indi-
cate whether it was the function of the legislature, rather than the judicial system,
to recognize privacy rights. See id.
106. 544 N.W.2d 21 (Minn. 1996).
107. See id.
108. See id. at 23-24. The plaintiffs alleged that the photos that aired on The
Maury Povich Show were photos of themselves rather than photos of the parties be-
ing talked about on the show. See id. at 24. The photos were shown at times coin-
ciding with assertions of sexual abuse. See id.
109. See id. at 28 (holding that to allow emotional harm as basis for defamation
claim would be inconsistent with the court's rejection of privacy claims).
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Richie to stand for the proposition that the Minnesota Supreme Court spe-
cifically declined to recognize the invasion of privacy tort. However, the
facts in many of these cases did not warrant recognizing privacy as a cause
of action. The plaintiffs in these actions either stated claims other than
privacy under which they could recover or they did not encounter undue
or oppressive publicity. Lake provided sufficiently egregious facts for
the supreme court to take notice.
110. See Estate of Benson v. Minnesota Bd. of Med. Practice, 526 N.W.2d 634,
637 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995) (denying recovery to physician's widow who sued for
violation of privacy for publication of physician's HIV status); Copeland v. Hub-
bard Broad., Inc., 526 N.W.2d 402, 406 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995) (denying recovery
to homeowners who claimed a violation of privacy after events that were video-
taped in their home were later broadcast); Robbinsdale Clinic, P.A. v. Pro-Life Ac-
tion Ministries, 515 N.W.2d 88, 92 (Minn. Ct. App. 1994) (denying privacy claim
for disclosure of public information and citing Hendry as expressly declining to
recognize the privacy tort); Markgraf v. Douglas Corp., 468 N.W.2d 80, 84 (Minn.
Ct. App. 1991) (denying recovery for claim of invasion of privacy for release of
medical records and citing Hendry as the basis for its refusing to recognize the pri-
vacy tort); House v. Sports Films & Talents, Inc., 351 N.W.2d 684, 685 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1984) (denying recovery for invasion of privacy to individuals who were
filmed for a football recruiting video and citing Hendry as rejecting privacy tort).
Federal courts interpreting Minnesota law have followed the Minnesota Court of
Appeals' lead in this area. See Ruzicka v. Conde Nast Publications, Inc., 939 F.2d
578, 583 n.8 (8th Cir. 1991) (citing Hendry as reason for denying recovery to indi-
vidual who alleged invasion of privacy by publication of personal information in
Glamour magazine article); Bystrom v. Fridley High Sch., Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 14,
822 F.2d 747, 754 (8th Cir. 1987) (evaluating school publication guidelines and
stating that Hendry rejected the tort of privacy); Movie Systems, Inc. v. Heller, 710
F.2d 492, 496 (8th Cir. 1983) (denying recovery to individual for electronic surveil-
lance by television programming distributor and citing Hendy as rejecting the tort
of invasion of privacy).
111. See, e.g., Deli v. University of Minn., 578 N.W.2d 779, 783 (Minn. CL App.
1998) (holding that the court should not subvert the law of contract to create an
exception to the plaintiff's case); Estate of Benson, 526 N.W.2d at 637 (holding that
a privacy action does not survive death); Copeland, 526 N.W.2d at 406 (disallowing
a privacy claim where the plaintiffs failed to allege any injury not addressed by
their trespass claim); Robbinsdale Clinic, 515 N.W.2d at 92 (stating that the plaintiff
had not shown a violation of the right of privacy); Markgraf 468 N.W.2d at 81
(dismissing privacy claim as plaintiff lacked a factual basis for the claim); Tibbetts
v. Crossroads, Inc., 411 N.W.2d 535, 537-38 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987) (holding that
the privacy claim was not well articulated and that the plaintiff did not assert facts
supporting it); Sports Films, 351 N.W.2d at 685 (holding that the facts did not sup-
port a claim for invasion of privacy).
112. See supra note 111 and accompanying text.
113. See Lake v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 582 N.W.2d 231, 235 (Minn. 1998) (stat-
ing that the plaintiffs alleged privacy interests worthy of protection).
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IV. THE LAKE DECISION
A. The Facts
Ellie Lake and Melissa Weber were on vacation in Mexico when
Weber's sister took a picture of them standing naked together outside114
their hotel shower. When they returned from their vacation, they took115
their rolls of film to the local Wal-Mart store for developing. When they
picked up the photos, they were informed that one of the negatives was
not developed due to its "nature."" 6
A few months later, an acquaintance alluded to the supposedly unde-
veloped photograph and questioned their sexual orientation. 117 Another
friend claimed to have been shown a copy of the photograph by a Wal-
Mart employee.18
Alleging that a Wal-Mart employee put this photograph into circula-
tion, Lake and Weber sued Wal-Mart and the employee for invasion of119
privacy. They claimed that the defendants invaded their privacy, ap-
propriated their likeness, published their private lives and placed them in
a false light. 12 The trial court dismissed the action, stating that Minnesota
does not recognize the tort of invasion of privacy.21
Citing both Hendiy and Richie, the Minnesota Court of Appeals af-
firmed the trial court, again stating that Minnesota did not recognize inva-122
sion of privacy by private individuals as a cause of action. The court also
stated that its function was not to establish new causes of action.
12 3
114. See id. at 232.
115. See id. at 233.
116. See id.
117. See id.
118. See id.
119. See id.
120. See id.
121. See id. at 232.
122. See Lake v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 566 N.W.2d 376, 378 (Minn. Ct. App.
1997).
123. See id.
1999] 1013
15
Prine: Torts—No Longer Living in a Glass House: Every Minnesotan is Enti
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1999
WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW
B. The Court's Analysis
Declaring its power to create common law doctrines, 2 4 the Minne-
sota Supreme Court in Lake established the right to privacy from private125
intrusion in Minnesota. The Lake court stated that whether to recog-
nize these torts was a question of first impression for the court because•. 126
previous cases had addressed the issue only in dicta.
Although the court did not provide any reasoning for its recognition
of the specific torts, it ultimately recognized three of Prosser's four privacy
torts: intrusion upon seclusion, appropriation, and publication of privatefa 127
facts. It declined to recognize the tort of false light, reasoning that it
was similar to defamation'
2 8 and would expand litigation profusely.
29
V. ANALYSIS OF THE LAKE DECISION
The Minnesota Supreme Court was correct to recognize the right to
privacy. Today's technology makes the protection of individual privacy
more crucial than ever. 3 0 Case precedent from across the United States
124. See Lake, 582 N.W.2d at 233 n.6 (referring to previous cases in which the
court had abolished common law immunities as support for its assertion that it has
the ability to create common law causes of action). The dissent, however, con-
tended that the act of creating new causes of action is reserved solely for the legis-
lature. See id. at 236-37 (Tomljanovich, J., dissenting). The Minnesota Supreme
Court's decisions regarding the determination of whether the legislature or the
courts have the power to create new causes of action have been contradictory.
Compare Lambertson v. Cincinnati Corp., 312 Minn. 114, 125-29, 257 N.W.2d 679,
687-89 (1977) (fashioning a new damage rule for contribution and indemnity laws
after stating that the legislature had removed a common law remedy, even though
this area of law is primarily defined by the legislature) with Salin v. Kloempken,
322 N.W.2d 736, 738-41 (Minn. 1982) (refusing to recognize a cause of action for
loss of parental consortium largely due to its difficulty in figuring damages, even
though the action had some common law support).
125. See Lake, 582 N.W.2d at 234-36.
126. See id, at 233 n.1.
127. See id. at 236.
128. See id. at 235-36. The court declined to recognize the tort of false light
because it is not subject to as many restrictions as defamation, a very similar cause
of action. See id. at 236 n.27 (noting that defamation restrictions include an abso-
lute privilege for public service or administration ofjustice, a conditional privilege
for public officials, and retraction).
129. See Lake, 582 N.W.2d at 235-36. Although the court showed concern
about false light competing with other societal interests, it did not express any res-
ervations about the other torts. For example, the court did not discuss the publi-
cation of private facts tort as possibly conflicting with the public's interest in news
and information. This tort, in particular, has been criticized as no longer reflect-
ing needed rights due to the changing definition of what constitutes "public inter-
est." See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
130. See infra notes 134-141 and accompanying text.
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has embraced the concern, expressed long ago by Warren and Bran-131
deis, that modern enterprise and invention necessitates the need to
132
recognize a right to privacy from intrusion by private individuals. How-
ever, the court's failure to articulate a meaningful standard leaves the new
right's application uncertain.
13 3
New methods of communication and other technological advances
have dramatically increased the possibility of invasion of a person's pri-134
vacy. For example, due to network developments, patients' medical re-
cords can be viewed by as many as eighty people after just a single trip to
see a physician. Further, devices such as Intellidata, a new telecommu-
nications tool, provide businesses with personal information about incom-
ing telephone callers without the caller's knowledge.136 The Internet also137
presents substantial risks to personal privacy. The advent of "cookies," a
method by which Internet sites store information about persons browsing
the web, poses serious privacy concerns because "cookie" data is fre-138
quently disclosed to companies for marketing purposes. In addition,
due to the rush to release new web browsers, software security is often left
131. See supra notes 65-72 and accompanying text; Warren and Brandeis, supra
note 11, at 196.
132. See supra notes 13-16 and accompanying text.
133. See infra notes 142-147 and accompanying text.
134. See Christine A. Varney, Consumer Privacy in the Information Age: A View from
the United States, 505 PRAC. L. INST./PATENTS 629, 634 (1996) (stating that personal
information is being collected at a rate and to a degree unthinkable even five years
ago); Anne Meredith Fulton, Cyberspace and The Internet: Who Will be the Privacy Po-
lice?, 3 COMM. L. CONSPECrUS 63, 70 (1995) (noting that the benefits of technology
as relating to privacy dwindle, as information can be sent via computer in seconds
with the possibility that it could intercepted, read and widely disseminated); see also
Katrin Shatz Byford, Privacy in Cyberspace: Constructing a Model of Privacy for the Elec-
tronic Communication Environment, 24 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 1, 2 (1998)
(noting that the need for privacy law has never been greater and listing numerous
technological advances invoking privacy issues); Mark E. Budnitz, Privacy Protection
for Consumer Transactions in Electronic Commerce: Why Self-Regulation is Inadequate, 49
S.C. L. REv. 847, 859 (1998) (discussing how businesses are covertly collecting in-
formation about consumers without their consent; mentioning the detrimental
outcomes of inaccurate data).
135. See Christina M. Rackett, Telemedicine Today and Tomorrow: Why "Virtual"
Privacy is Not Enough, 25 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 167, 173 (1997); see also Robert S. Peck,
Extending the Constitutional Right to Privacy in the New Technological Age, 12 HOFSTRA
L. REv. 893, 896 (1984) (discussing a new form of identification card that, when
attached to a computer, can reveal personal data such as medical files and finan-
cial accounts).
136. See Paul Henroid, Caller Intellidata: Privacy in the Developing Telecommunica-
tions Industry, 76 WASH. U. L.Q. 351, 356 (1998).
137. See Varney, supra note 134, at 632 (noting that the transactional data trail
[of the Internet] poses an incredible risk to personal privacy).
138. See Mary M. Luria, Controlling Web Advertising: Spamming, Linking, Framing,
and Privacy, 14 COMPUTER L., Nov. 1997, at 10, 15 (1997).
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by the wayside. s9 Recently, a security researcher discovered a bug in a
web browser that allows computer hackers to steal files from the hard
drives of browsing computers. The benefits of these technological de-
vices pale in comparison to the detrimental effects they could have on a141
person's right to privacy. The Lake decision will allow Minnesotans to
benefit from modern technological advances while providing relief for
these intrusions.
Nonetheless, because the Minnesota Supreme Court did not fully
explain why it chose to recognize the right to privacy torts or establish lim-
its on these causes of action, the Lake decision may be difficult for lower
courts to apply. Even Warren and Brandeis, in their inaugural discussion
of privacy, recognized the need for limitations on the right. 14 Acknowl-
edging this need, most states have fashioned limits on their privacy torts
143
either by conferring privileges on some defendants or by requiring cer-
tain plaintiffs to meet higher standards to recover.144
To limit litigation and protect conflicting interests, Minnesota's
lower courts should likewise delineate privileges. For example, Minnesota
courts should create privileges for news providers to protect their first
amendment rights. 145 Courts should also give employers a qualified privi-
lege to perform drug testing on their employees so as to maintain safe
work environments. In addition, Minnesota courts should place restric-
tions on plaintiffs who are public figures or public officials, making them
achieve higher standards in order to recover under the tort.147 The legis-
lature should place limits on the tort as well by granting certain parties
specific privileges that would protect them from suit.
VI. CONCLUSION
Considering the rapid advances in communication, Warren and
Brandeis' argument that the common law must meet the demands im-
posed by continuous changes in modern society remains significant. In
Lake, the Minnesota Supreme Court recognized this concern by granting
every Minnesotan relief for invasion of their privacy by private individuals.
In doing so, however, the court did not set guidelines for the application
139. See Scott Spanbauer, More Bugs Found in Internet Explorer, Navigator (visited
Aug. 1, 1999) (Oct. 14, 1998) <http://www.cnn.com/TECH/computing/
9810/14/mobugs.idg/index.html> (discussing the discovery of three holes in the
security systems of Netscape Navigator and Microsoft Internet Explorer).
140. See id.
141. See Fulton, supra note 134, at 70.
142. See supra notes 34-35 and accompanying text.
143. See supra notes 80-82 and accompanying text.
144. See supra notes 83-84 and accompanying text.
145. See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
146. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
147. See supra notes 83-84 and accompanying text.
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of the tort. Minnesota's lower courts must look to other jurisdictions for
direction and establish boundaries on the tort.
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